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Abstract 
The evolution of the legal and regulatory framework for oversight of Nigeria’s First Nuclear Research Reactor 
(NIRR-1) and the organization of the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) are presented along with 
the development of the guides applied in the licensing of the various stages of NIRR-1. The submission 
requirements for the authorization of NIRR-1 were appraised. Also, the regulatory oversight process and the 
fulfillment of the obligations imposed by international nuclear safety conventions and Nigerian participation in 
international activities for nuclear safety were discussed. 
Keywords: Research reactor; fuel cycle; highly enriched uranium; nuclear material; core conversion; radiation 
sources; nuclear safety; radiation protection; safeguards; non-proliferation; legal and regulatory infrastructure; 
neutron activation analysis; inspection. 
1. Evolution of an independent regulatory authority 
Nigeria’s first nuclear activities predated the present national legal and regulatory infrastructure for nuclear 
safety and radiation protection, so they were largely unregulated or had ad-hoc regulatory oversight. Uranium 
exploration in Nigeria began in the early seventies with the defunct Geological Survey Department, now 
Nigerian Geological Survey Agency, and the Nigerian Mining Corporation [1]. In 1976, the Nigerian Atomic 
Energy Commission Act No. 46 [2] was promulgated, which established two nuclear research centres. 
Furthermore, in 1979, the Nigerian Uranium Mining Company was established with Total Compagnie Minière 
of France as its technical partner, to explore and exploit uranium ore deposits in the country.  
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Despite these, there was no legal or regulatory control of fuel cycle activities in the country. Nigeria though 
showed commitment to international nuclear safety, security and safeguards. In 1968, Nigeria signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [3] and voted in 1995 for its indefinite extension. In 2001, Nigeria 
signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement [4] and in 1990, ratified the Convention on Early Notification 
of a Nuclear Accident [5] and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency [6]. With these and the commencement of talks between Nigeria and the IAEA for the supply of a 
research reactor, in 1995 the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act No. 19[7] (Act) was promulgated. 
These and the establishment of the NNRA in 2001 facilitated the installation and commissioning of NIRR-1, 
covered by IAEA INFCIRC/526 - Project and Supply Agreement of 1996, between the IAEA and the 
governments of Nigeria and China [8]. Located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training (CERT), 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, NIRR-1 is a 30KW tank-in-pool type reactor with 90% Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel, designed for teaching, research and for use in Neutron Activation Analysis and 
limited radioisotope production [9]. 
2. Legislative and regulatory framework 
The Establishment of NNRA in 2001 heralded implementation of the Act, by which NNRA has responsibility 
for nuclear safety and radiological protection regulation in Nigeria and shall ensure the safe promotion of 
nuclear research and development, and the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is also to 
perform all necessary functions to enable Nigeria meet its national and international safeguards and safety 
obligations in the application of nuclear energy; regulate the exploration, mining and milling of radioactive ores 
and other ores associated with the presence of radioactive substances; and advise the Federal Government on 
nuclear security, safety and radiation protection. 
2.1 Powers 
The Act empowered NNRA amongst others, to license operators of nuclear research reactors and critical 
assemblies, nuclear power reactors and other facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is also to establish in 
cooperation with other competent national authorities, plans and procedures which shall be periodically tested 
and assessed for coping with radiation emergencies and abnormal occurrences involving nuclear materials and 
radiation sources. 
2.2 Regulatory control programme 
The main elements of NNRA Regulatory Control Programme are issuance of regulations and guidance; granting 
of authorizations; carrying out oversight functions; emergency planning and response; and ancillary functions. 
2.2.1 Regulations and guidance 
Shortly after its establishment, the NNRA set up a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) called the Committee 
for the Establishment of Licensing Procedure for Nuclear Research Reactors and Licensing of Reactor 
Operators in Nigeria. TAC was to develop guidelines for siting, design, construction, installation, 
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commissioning and operation of nuclear research reactors. TAC developed the Draft Guide for Licensing of 
Nuclear Research Reactors and Reactor Operators in Nigeria [10] (Code). This Guide along with the IAEA 
Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors [11] and other relevant IAEA technical documents were 
applied in the assessment and authorization processes. 
2.2.2 Authorization 
By the Act, NNRA may issue authorizations for all activities involving exposure to ionizing radiation, including 
radioactive material, nuclear material, radioactive waste, prescribed substances. Also, no source or practice can 
be authorized except through a system of application, notification, registration or licensing. Authorization can be 
in the form of notification, permit, certificate, or licence. The procedure involves notification of practice through 
assessment, inspection and final authorization. 
3. Licensing NIRR-1 
The authorization process for NIRR-1 was initiated by the formal request of CERT in 2001 for the retroactive 
authorization of the Siting and the Design and Construction of NIRR-1. NNRA saw this as a major challenge 
because the Siting and the Design and Construction of NIRR-1 were done before NNRA was established. In this 
regard, TAC continued to play an advisory role and its recommendations formed the bases for the authorization. 
The regulations it developed guided the licensing of the various stages of NIRR-1 development. TAC reviewed 
the “whole life cycle” of the reactor and established criteria for the authorization of each of the distinct “stages” 
and conditions governing the safe performance of these activities. 
3.1 Methodology for licensing NIRR-1 
The IAEA played a key role in developing the capacity of NNRA to authorize NIRR-1 by providing training for 
the newly recruited staff of NNRA through a training assistance and expert service. TAC applied the Code and 
the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors to review the “whole life cycle” of NIRR-1 and 
establish criteria for the authorization of each of the distinct “stages”. These were namely, Siting; Design and 
Construction; Fuel Importation; Commissioning and Operation and; Decommissioning. Conditions were 
established for the safe performance of these activities. 
3.2 Siting 
In appraising the Siting, the following parameters were considered: General site description; Man-made and 
natural phenomena; Geological description; Demography of the area; Surface and groundwater hydrology; and 
Meteorological description of the NIRR-1 site and its surroundings. This was to establish compliance with the 
Regulations and the need for imposing additional controls on the already developed site. The only controllable 
of these factors was the demography of the area. Thus NNRA demanded that no residential, commercial or any 
other buildings unrelated in objective with NIRR-1 be located within the fenced territory of CERT. NNRA 
issued certificates for siting, design and construction retroactively to NIRR-1 after its application and safety 
analysis report were reviewed and approved. The NNRA also issued licence to import nuclear fuel, and for 
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cross-country transportation of the nuclear fuel between port of entry and CERT. 
3.3 Design and construction 
Though NIRR-1 was designed and constructed before NNRA, it nevertheless decided to review and assess the 
basic design with a view to verifying its compatibility with the site. In addition to the report of a review by a 
hired Civil Engineering consultant, NNRA also reviewed: NIRR-1 Safety Analysis Report; Operational Limits 
and Conditions of NIRR-1; and Quality Assurance Manuals for Miniature Neutron Source Reactor. Parameters 
relevant to the design and construction of the reactor were found to be in agreement with the pertinent site 
parameters and the Code. Additionally, the construction was in agreement with the design. These formed the 
bases for imposing the licence conditions, which also satisfied the requirements for the retroactive authorization. 
3.4 Fuel importation 
Fuel importation, was greatly influenced by the heightened concern for security arising from the September-11 
2001 incident. In addition to IAEA requirements relating to Category II Nuclear Materials, NNRA reviewed and 
upgraded the security arrangements in CERT submissions and integrated the fuel shipment and the 
commissioning program. This eliminated any intermediate storage for the nuclear fuel. Strict conditions were 
imposed such that the fuel was evacuated from the port of entry within 1 hour of arrival. Reactor core assembly 
also commenced about 36 hours of fuel arrival at CERT. Furthermore, security during transportation between 
the port of entry and the reactor site was the responsibility of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Consistent 
with government posture on nuclear safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation, the NNRA also gave a written 
undertaking to the country of origin of the fuel, that the fuel would be used solely for peaceful purposes and 
would not be used for the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device or for any military 
purpose. It would also only be installed or used in a facility under IAEA safeguards. Additionally, the fuel 
would not be transferred beyond the territory or jurisdiction of the government of Nigeria without the prior 
consent of the government of the country of supply and would be under appropriate physical protection with 
reference to the recommendations of IAEA. 
3.5 Commissioning and operation 
The NNRA reviewed the Commissioning Program and Procedures by considering the conditions and 
preliminary operational limits as well as the schedule and procedures for shipment of packages containing fuel 
elements. The equipment installation report on NIRR-1 and the maintenance manuals were also assessed. Also 
considered were the programmes for systems maintenance, testing and inspection; radiation monitoring; and 
physical security. Authorization for commissioning and operation of the reactor were issued only after finalizing 
the arrangements for the shipment of the fuel to Nigeria. 
3.6 Decommissioning 
A tripartite agreement between IAEA, China, and Nigeria provided for the return of the spent fuel to China. 
Further developments of this aspect of the regulatory provisions were ongoing. 
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4. Regulatory inspections of NIRR-1 
With the delivery of the first nuclear fuel to Nigeria in December 2003 and the commissioning of NIRR-1 in 
September 2004, Nigeria started receiving annual IAEA Safeguards Inspectors for verification of nuclear 
material accountancy and the performance of design information questionnaire. This was pursuant to Nigeria’s 
obligations under the Protocol Additional to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which Nigeria signed in 
2001[12]. The inspections included physical inventory, verification of nuclear materials and design information 
verification. With the establishment of the State System of Accounting and Control, Nigeria commenced the 
submission of annual reports on all safeguarded nuclear material and activities covered under the Additional 
Protocol Declaration. These included, Material Balance Report; Physical Inventory Listings; Inventory Change 
Report and; Nuclear Material Accounting. 
NNRA also carried out quarterly safety inspections to assess compliance with the Act; the approved Operational 
Limits contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report as well as the Terms and Conditions of the Reactor 
Operation Licence. In August 2005, non-compliance issues were discovered during one of these inspections, 
resulting in enforcement action. CERT was directed to stop operating the reactor until among others, its licenses 
were renewed. It could however carry out the weekly water purification and maintenance. In 2009, a 
performance assessment was carried out on NIRR-1 safety. NIRR-1 had operated since inception without any 
major incident; however, concerns over the need to maintain and enhance safety levels led to significant 
emphasis on strengthening the international safety regime. Thus in November 2009, an IAEA Integrated Safety 
Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) Mission visited CERT under a Technical Cooperation Project. 
NNRA participated as an Observer during the Mission. The INSARR Mission was designed to address the 
general operational safety of NIRR-1 and to carry out a comprehensive and independent safety assessment. It 
covered the following areas amongst others: quality assurance programme; safety documentation; conduct of 
operations and procedures; record keeping; maintenance programme and modifications; personnel training and 
qualification; radiation protection programme including dose records, waste management, emergency planning 
and preparedness; organizational structure as regards safe operation of the reactor; and administrative 
organization structure for safety matters. At the end of the mission, IAEA made recommendations including 
establishment and implementation of periodic testing program for the items important to safety. NNRA later 
included some of these recommendations in CERT Operational Licence Conditions, especially for the 
performance of periodic operability checks and calibration tests for some defined safety parameters and the 
update of the Safety Analysis Report to reflect the actual status of the reactor facility. This INSAAR was 
followed by a one-day Technical Meeting held in June 2010 attended by participants from seven Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies to review and assess the performance of NIRR-1 right from when it became critical. 
One of the recommendations of the meeting was to extend the life of the Reactor Operation Licence from one to 
two years. This was implemented by NNRA. 
To further achieve threat reduction on vulnerable radioactive sources and nuclear materials, the NNRA in 
partnership with the IAEA and the United States Department of Energy carried out physical protection 
assessment and upgrade on the facility. It was funded by the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security. The scope of the 
work included the provision of intrusion detection equipment; installation of remote monitoring equipment; and 
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the provision of training for CERT personnel. The physical security upgrade was done in 2011. 
5. Reactor core fuel conversion from HEU to LEU 
CERT in 2010 notified NNRA of its research collaboration with the United States of America aimed at the 
conversion of the NIRR-1 core from HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuels. Consequently CERT made a 
presentation on its preliminary findings on the research work to NNRA in December 2010. From the 
presentation it was clear that CERT was making progress in this respect, though CERT was yet to make a 
formal application for authorization for the conversion to take place. By 2014, there was report containing 
results of activities performed for the conversion of from HEU to LEU fuel [13]. Furthermore, the conversion 
was not foreseen to present any new potential accidents nor did it increase the consequences of any of the 
postulated design basis accidents identified in the current approved Safety Analysis Report. 
6. Challenges 
At the time of the authorization of NIRR-1, NNRA was in its infancy and saw the process as a major challenge 
because NIRR-1 had been sited, designed and constructed before NNRA was established. The necessary 
regulatory and guidance documents which were to be applied in the authorization process were largely 
unavailable and had to be newly developed. Additionally, because most NNRA staff were newly recruited and 
inexperienced, NNRA had to rely on the services of a TAC, composed of multi-institutional members. This 
significantly increased the overhead cost of the process. The development of NNRA manpower also posed a 
major challenge. The special skills needed for oversight of NIRR-1 were acquired through technical cooperation 
with the IAEA and by expert services sponsored by the IAEA and through international cooperation with other 
friendly countries. 
7. Conclusion and recommendations 
NIRR-1 has operated safely and without any significant incident or accident. As a pioneer in Nigeria, it has 
inspired and presented a veritable tool to many Nigerian scholars and researchers in their various endeavours. It 
shall continue to provide important benefits, including research, education, materials testing and medical and 
industrial applications. In this regard, it is important to ensure that the use of NIRR-1 remains safe, well 
regulated and its environmental conditions remain sound. To strengthen regulatory infrastructure, the Draft 
Guide for Licensing of Nuclear Research Reactors and Reactor Operators in Nigeria, should be approved by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice. 
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